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Collective and Egoless Consciousness 
Significance for Philosophy of Science and for 
the Mind-Body Problem 
Axel A. Randrup 
Center for Interdisciplinary Research 
Roskilde, Denmark 
Collective consciousness and egoless consciousness can be regarded as realistic 
alternatives or complements to individual consciousness. This contention is supported 
by evidence from the literature (psychological, philosophical, anthropological, 
spiritual, Buddhist) and by personal observations and interpretations. It contradicts 
the idea that a philosophy which regards reality as consisting only of conscious 
experiences must inevitably lead to solipsism. 
I N A previous paper (Randrup, 1997a) the author proposed a skepticist-idealist 
philosophy, claiming that reality consists en-
tirely of conscious experiences. This proposal is 
seen as a more consistent and unified alternative 
to materialism. Science is regarded as a catalog 
of intersubjective, conscious experiences ("obser-
vations") recognized as scientific and structured 
by means of concepts and theories (also regarded 
as conscious experiences). Materialism is seen as 
possible and useful within a certain (large) do-
main, but inconsistent beyond that domain. This 
view is supported by examples of contradictions 
and problems met in materialist science (in cog-
nitive neurophysiology, the evolutionary study of 
cognition, statistics, physics, second-order cyber-
netics) and by the felt reality of intense nature 
experiences (Randrup, 1997a). 
Philosophies of this type (idealism, phenom-
enalism, skepticism) have been known in the West 
in modern times since the work of the philoso-
phers Berkeley and Hume in the 18th century and 
have often been met with the objection that they 
entail solipsism (Randrup, 1997a). I will argue 
that solipsism (individualism) is only one possible 
frame of reference for consciousness. Collective 
consciousness and egoless consciousness are seen 
as viable alternatives or complements. 
ea., Collective Conscim11.s:nes§ ~ 
I N DAILY life in Western countries, much is related 
to the individual, and the concept of the 
individual seems clear. In Western philosophy, 
however, there has been extended controversy 
over the notions of "self," "individuality," and 
"personal identity" (Gallagher, 1998; Gallagher 
& Shear, 1997-1999; Hardy, 1998, pp. 33-37; 
Hughes, 1999; Koffka, 1963, ch. 8; Kolak & 
Martin, 1991; Mach, 1914, ch. I, sect. 12; Noonan, 
1996; Penelhum, 1967; Turkle, 1984, 1997; White, 
1997). And in recent years, ideas of computer and 
brain networking, as well as studies of social 
interaction, have suggested to some authors a 
more collective concept of mind and consciousness 
(Artigiani, 1995; Burns & Engdahl, 1998; Freeman 
& Burns, 1996; Garfield, 1993; Graham, 1999; 
Gustavson & Harung, 1994; Huberman, 1989; 
Lansky, 1999; Nunez, 1997; Swing, 1999). Given 
this background, it does not seem so obvious, as 
is often assumed, that mind and consciousness 
are always associated with an individual, and that 
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regarding reality as consisting entirely of 
conscious experiences should therefore entail 
solipsism. 
In various non-Western cultures, such as 
African, Aboriginal Australian, American Indian, 
East Asian, and "preconquest" cultures, views and 
attitudes are encountered which emphasize the 
collective and relational features ofhuman beings 
and their minds at least as much as the individual 
features; indeed it seems that modern Western 
individualism is an exceptional or unique 
phenomenon among the world's cultures, past and 
present (Carrithers, Collins, & Lukes, 1985, chs. 
5, 6, 7, 8; Harris, 1997; Hayward, 1987, pp. 55, 
211-212, 281; Kao & Sinha, 1997, chs. 3, 9, 16; 
Lommel, 1969, pp. 155, 159, 161; Mudimbe, 1987; 
Ndaw, 1983, ch. 3 and pp. 205-207; Wautischer, 
1998, chs. 2, 3, 5 ). As an example of emphasis on 
the collective aspect, I quote Okuyama (1993), who 
writes about the three senses of self among the 
Japanese: the collective, the social, and the 
individual sense. Ofthese, the collective sense is 
seen as the most important and fundamental one. 
Okuyama states explicitly: 
Japanese people commonly think that the self 
exists only in relationships with others ... our 
mind is thought to exist in a field of 
relationships. The self cannot be considered 
separate from the relationship field nor having 
as clear a boundary, as Western people 
imagine ... one ofthe conditions to be an adult 
is the ability to feel somebody else's or the 
group's feelings. (p. 29) 
Accordingly, Okuyama believes that restoring 
a healthy collective sense of self is an important 
task for psychotherapy. (Very recently Okuyama 
[1999] has stated that she thinks the Japanese 
are now losing their collective sense of self with 
the result that many children and adolescents feel 
lonely and disconnected.) 
Although individuality is so prominent in 
Western cultures and daily life, there are features 
of collectivity. "Objective" science seems to be an 
important example of this. In order to be 
recognized as scientific, an observation has to be 
confirmed by several scientists-become 
intersubjective. An intersubjective observation is 
often conceived as the same observation or 
experience distributed over different individual 
minds or consciousnesses and then unified by 
means of an "objective" materialist concept. It can, 
however, also be conceived (and experienced) to 
be unified from the beginning as one observation 
constituting a part of a collective consciousness. 
Both of these interpretations ofintersubjectivity 
contradict solipsism. The materialist concepts are 
usually projected "out there" and accorded an 
existence oftheir own, separate from consciousness. 
The latter step is intersubjective inside wide 
circles, but it has led to contradictions as 
mentioned in the introduction above and is not 
shared by all (Randrup, 1997a). If the metaphysics 
of objective materialism is given up, then the 
interpretation involving collective consciousness 
appears to be the natural way of expressing the 
unity of intersubjective observations. Since 
several intersubjective observations and theories 
exist in science, we may envisage that scientists, 
particularly individuals within one discipline, 
have a significant part of their consciousness in 
common, a collective consciousness. The collective 
part of their consciousness will be associated with 
the brains of all the persons involved and not only 
with one brain (brains here are seen as heuristic 
structures in the scientific catalog mentioned in 
the introduction). 
Other parts of mind or consciousness appear 
to be more individual, but the boundary between 
individual and collective consciousness is blurred. 
If we talk together about our experiences, the 
intersubjective or collective part will be expanded. 
This aspect of intersubjectivity has been studied 
thoroughly by the phenomenological school of 
psychology at Copenhagen University (Rubin; 
Tranekjrer Rasmussen; From). Tranekjrer 
Rasmussen (1968, ch. 3, with references) writes 
that through communication it is possible to make 
certain conscious experiences "intersubjectively 
transportable" within a group of people. A set of 
intersubjectively transportable experiences is 
called a recursive basis. Such a recursive basis is 
established within scientific disciplines (technical 
languages), but Tranekjaer Rasmussen writes that 
within the disciplines little has been done to state 
the recursive bases explicitly, and he thinks that 
working to accomplish this will be an important 
task for both epistemology and pedagogics. 
Obtaining intersubjectivity in psychology/ 
psychiatry aided by communication between 
scientists has been described recently in detail 
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by Marchais, Grize, and Randrup (1995, p. 371), 
and Hardy (1998, pp. 180-184) has described how 
shared or interface "semantic constellations" can 
emerge from ordinary conversation. It has also 
been contended that many concepts such as 
"eleven," "entropy," and even "solipsism" cannot 
be individual at all, because from the beginning 
they are shaped by education and verbal 
communication (Jlllrgensen, 1963, p. 176; P. 
Marchais, personal communication, March 20, 
1999; Thornton, 1996). Thus, for example, 
Thornton concludes that the concept "solipsism" 
is inherently incoherent. 
Living and acting together can also enhance 
intersubjectivity and collective experience. The 
Danish philosopher and psychologist Jlllrgensen 
has discussed this in some detail (1963, ch. 7). He 
writes about "person-identification," that is, 
identification with another person, and distin-
guishes between emotive and conative forms. The 
former refers to the catching effect of emotional 
expressions and the latter refers to situations 
where persons act together to reach the same goal. 
More recently Vaughan (1995) wrote in a similar 
way about emotive identification: 
The soul that emphathetically identifies with 
both the pain and the joy of others begins to 
see that in the inner world we are not 
separated from each other. Peace and joy, no 
less than pain and sorrow, are shared, 
collective experiences. (p. 5) 
And in a recent special issue of the journal 
ReVision (Rothberg & Masters, 1998), several 
authors have given examples of collective and 
egoless consciousness in couples living and act-
ing together in intimate relationships. It seems 
probable that living and acting closely together 
in smaller groups has contributed to the experi-
ence and concepts of collective consciousness 
encountered in various non-Western cultures. 
It thus appears that there are means for 
sharing experiences which at first sight appear 
to be strictly individual and inaccessible to "other 
minds" (Randrup, 1999). This is an alternative to 
solipsism, and it recalls the old philosophical 
problem about the far side of the moon, which for 
many years was regarded as unobservable, until 
it finally became possible to observe it by means 
of space travel. 
~ Egoless Consciousness ~ 
I N EGOLESS experiences, the ego, the self, is 
neglected or "forgotten." There are many 
descriptions of such cases in the literature. 
In reports of experiences regarded as spiritual 
or mystical it is often mentioned that there is a 
general feeling of unity including fading or 
complete disappearance of the boundary between 
subject and object. Dissolution of all ego 
boundaries and forgetfulness of the ego are also 
mentioned (Bastian, 1998; Cohen & Phipps, 1979, 
pp. 92, 111; Flier, 1995, p. 144; Marchais, Grize, 
& Randrup 1995, p. 381; Rothberg & Masters, 
1998, pp. 16-17, 38-39; Smith & Tart, 1998, pp. 
98,100, 105; Stace, 1960, ch. 2;Vaughan, 1989, 
pp. 6, 8). In the literature about Buddhism and 
Indian philosophy, egolessness or "empty of ego" 
is discussed comprehensively. The moral 
accompaniment of egolessness is described as 
spontaneous compassion (Belfer, 1995; Epstein, 
1989; Hayward, 1987; Joonho, 1999; Lindtner, 
1998, pp. 11-12; Miller, 1996; Osho Rajneesh, 
1997, ch.16; Pallis, 1998; Puhakka, 1998; Shakya, 
1996, preface, chs. 2, 3, 5). 
Some secular experiences are also described as 
egoless. Thus Mach (1914, ch. I, sect. 12) writes 
that during absorption in some idea the ego may 
be partially or wholly absent. Similar statements 
are given by Flier (1995, p. 144) and by Osho 
Rajneesh (1997, ch. 16). More detailed descriptions 
of single cases have been published by Koffka 
(1963, pp. 323-328) and bymyself(Randrup, 1997a, 
pp. 21-22 [a personal experience]). 
Still, in daily life in Western cultures, the 
physical and social world is most often perceived 
with the ego in a central position. Since thought 
is more flexible than perception, it is, however, 
possible to think of the world in other ways, 
decentered from the ego or even with another ego 
as the center. The change from the Ptolemaic to 
the Copernican view of the planetary system is 
an example of such decentering. Since then, 
science has continued the decentering process and 
developed an "objective" world view. Because of 
the flexibility of thought it is possible to switch 
between decentered views and views centered on 
an ego or a collective and thus incorporate 
knowledge gained by the use of one system into 
other systems. In this way it is possible to use 
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decentered scientific knowledge either for 
egoistical or collective purposes. 
The decentered world of science is, however, 
most often considered as a material world 
projected "out there" and separate from the 
human mind. This makes it difficult to place "the 
observer" and consciousness in the scientific 
picture. In contrast, an egoless experience of the 
world (perceived or conceived) is still a conscious 
experience and thus avoids the dichotomies 
between observer and observed and between the 
material and the mental. On such a monistic 
background, worldviews centered on an ego, 
centered on a collective, or completely decentered 
(egoless) are not in conflict, but can be seen as 
different structures in the same catalog of 
conscious experiences or "observations." It is 
known that there can be more than one structure 
in a system of elements, for example, in 
ambiguous figures. These are perceived in two or 
more alternating gestalts only one at a time, but 
in thought it can be conceived that the two or more 
structures or gestalts exist simultaneously 
(Burling, 1964; Randrup, 1992, 1997b; Rosen, 
1978, pp. 495, 500). 
~ Conclusion e-&, 
THE EVIDENCE and interpretations discussed 
above indicate that collective consciousness 
and egoless consciousness can be regarded as 
realistic alternatives or complements to the more 
generally accepted individual consciousness in 
Western cultures. This undermines the contention 
that a philosophy which regards reality as 
consisting entirely of conscious experiences must 
inevitably lead to solipsism. 
Notes 
This paper is part of an ongoing study of idealist 
philosophy and follows an earlier paper (Randrup, 
1997a). I thank colleagues inside and outside the 
Center for Interdisciplinary Research for discussions 
and comments about this paper, especially Pierre 
Marchais, Raymond Swing, and Philippe Gross. 
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